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Summary 
Using data on the 20 Italian regions for the period 1970-1995, I examine whether the 
presence of social capital, as reflected in a number of different measures collected by 
Putnam (1993), affects economic productivity. I find three types of effects. First, social 
capital, when treated as an input to regional production, has a positive and significant 
effect in the South, but a much weaker effect in the North. Second, some forms of social 
capital can significantly increase regions’ propensities to make physical capital 
investments; however, dense networks of association reduce capital investment in both 
the North and South. Instrumental variables estimates show that social capital affects 
growth both directly and through affecting investment in physical capital. Third, social 
capital contributes positively to the rate of total factor productivity growth in the Italian 
regions.   
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2 Narayan (1999) traces it back as early as the work of Lyda J. Hanifan in 1916.
3 See, for example, Loury (1977), Coleman (1990), Ostrom (1990), and Becker (1996).
4 Narayan (1999), p. 6.
5 Helliwell and Putnam (1995) also examine the effects of social capital on economic growth, but because they do not have data on capital investment, they focus simply on growth in
gross domestic product per capita.  
1. Introduction
Social capital is not a new concept,2 but it has only recently begun to attract attention from
economists and other social scientists.3  The proper definition of the term remains controversial,
but Ostrom (2000, p. 176) characterizes it as “the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules
and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent
activity.”4  The work that has drawn the most attention to social capital is Robert Putnam’s Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993), which argued that the performance of
Italy’s 20 regional governments can be linked directly to the extent of civic spirit and associations
in the various regions.  While Putnam focused on the performance of government, economists are
more interested in the effects of social capital on economic performance.  In this paper, I examine
whether the measures of social capital developed by Putnam have a measurable impact on
economic output, capital investment, and total factor productivity growth in the various Italian
regions.5
The notion that social capital may affect economic growth is not terribly surprising.  Trust
may reduce the transaction costs of contracting by constraining opportunism, thereby promoting
capital investment.  Norms of reciprocity may suppress free riding, thereby enhancing the voluntary
provision of local public goods.  Networks of association may speed information transfer,
strengthening the knowledge spillovers that help create fast-growing innovation clusters.  At the
same time, Olson (1982) has stressed that the proliferation of organized interest groups (one form2
6 Their data on attitudes come from the World Values Survey, further details on which are available in Inglehart (1994).
of social capital) can choke off economic growth.  The relative importance of these various aspects
of social capital is thus ultimately an empirical issue.
While the notion that social capital may affect growth is familiar, attempts to measure the
impact of social capital quantitatively are few, and their results to date have been somewhat
contradictory.  Helliwell and Putnam (1995) find that a composite measure of social capital
(similar to that used here) was positively associated with growth in per capita income in Italy over
the period 1950-1990.  However, Helliwell (1996) finds that survey measures of trust and group
memberships are negatively and significantly associated with total factor productivity growth in a
sample of 17 OECD countries.  Inglehart (1994b) finds a negative relationship between social
capital and growth for high-income countries, but a positive relationship for low-income countries. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) find that positive attitudes toward trust and cooperation have a significant
positive effect on growth in GDP/capita and (less significantly) on investment/GDP for a sample of
29 market economies.6  However, when investment’s share of GDP is included as a right-hand side
variable, the social capital variables are no longer significant.  Knack and Keefer also study the
effects of group membership on economic performance, finding that groups have no significant
effect on income growth, but that some types of groups actually appear to retard investment.
Overall, then, previous empirical work speaks with several voices: trust has a positive
effect on growth in income per capita, but this effect is negligible when capital investment is
properly controlled for.  Trust appears to be positively associated with investment but group
membership is negatively associated with investment, while both trust and group membership
appear to be negatively associated with growth in total factor productivity, except perhaps in low-3
7 Knack and Keefer (1997) find an insignificant, but generally positive, relationship between social capital and total factor productivity.
income countries.  Furthermore, these results come from a variety of different data sets and time
periods, making it difficult to assemble a unified story about the economic effects of social capital.
This paper revisits the foregoing issues using detailed data on the twenty Italian regions
over the period from 1970 to 1995.  It uses the measures of social capital developed by Putnam
(1993) to explore the links between social capital and economic output.  Unlike Helliwell and
Putnam (1995), however, I have access to capital investment data on a regional basis, allowing for
detailed analyses of regional production functions, capital investment, and total factor productivity
growth, rather than just income/capita.  
There are three main findings.  First, when considered as a factor of production, social
capital has a measurable and generally positive effect on economic productivity in Italy, even after
controlling for levels of capital investment.  This effect appears weaker in the relatively developed
North than in the relatively underdeveloped South, however.  Second, social capital (with the
exception of networks of association) is positively and significantly associated with capital
investment (dense networks reduce investment in both North and South).  Furthermore, instrumental
variables estimations show that social capital affects productivity through both its effects on
investment and its direct effect on output.  Third, although rates of total factor productivity (TFP)
improvement are negatively correlated with all of Putnam’s measures of social capital, when initial
levels of value added in each region are controlled for, social capital is found to have a positive
(though only marginally significant) effect on TFP growth.  This last result contrasts with the
international studies of Inglehart (1994b) and Helliwell (1996), raising questions about whether
Italian social capital is somehow different than that in other countries, or whether inter-regional and
international studies are driven toward different results for other reasons.74
8 The discussion in this section draws heavily on Putnam (1993) and Narayan (1999).
9 Putnam (1993), pp. 167-171.
Section 2 discusses the links between social capital and economic growth, setting the stage
for the empirical work to follow.  Section 3 presents the basic model to be estimated, while section
4 describes the data used.  Section 5 offers the empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
2. Social Capital and Economic Growth
The study of the role of social capital in economic activity is still in its infancy.  No
comprehensive theoretical explanation has been advanced to explain exactly how particular aspects
of social capital affect economic productivity.  Nevertheless, it is possible to sketch some of the
more important aspects of social capital that have been discussed by economists and political
scientists, and to identify some of the ways in which these might be valuable.8
At the broadest level, social capital is sometimes taken to indicate the degree of generalized
trust (i.e., trust of persons whom one does not know directly) exhibited by members of a
community.  This is illustrated vividly in the context of rotating credit associations, in which all
members contribute regularly and equally to a fund that is given to each member in turn on a
rotating basis; such associations are apparently common throughout the world.9  Once a member has
had his turn to receive the fund, of course, he has strong incentives to immediately stop contributing. 
In order for the association to function, members must trust that this will not happen.  And in
practice such opportunism is not common, perhaps because of the threat of ostracism by other
members of the group and the potentially far-reaching impact on the individual’s reputation.  
Two elements of social capital have received particular attention: networks of association
and norms of generalized reciprocity.  Networks of association allow individuals to develop a5
reputation for trustworthiness with a large number of others at once.  This facilitates a broad,
community-based sense of trust.  To the extent these networks overlap in different ways, “cross-
cutting ties” are created that can help build shared norms across various social groups. 
Generalized reciprocity is exhibited in any long-term relationship in which one party contributes
now in the expectation that he will receive later.  Norms supporting such behavior allow for the
sharing of labor, equipment, and other assets by individuals.  A dense set of social networks with
cross-cutting ties can support the development of shared norms of generalized reciprocity.
How can networks, norms and trust contribute to economic productivity?  One obvious
avenue is by reducing transaction costs.  Between parties who do not trust one another, any long-
term arrangement must be supported by a carefully drafted contract, the more complete the better. 
Writing fully complete contracts is impossible, however, and even moderately detailed ones can be
quite costly to craft.  In many Italian regions, however, Brusco (1992, p. 182) notes that “contracts
between companies very often refer to the customary conventions of the particular area...The
existence of these implicit specifications, deriving from local customs and history and rooted in a
language that is well understood by everyone, enables firms to draw up spot contracts with very
low specification costs...This set of rules, shared by everyone and to which everyone has to adapt,
originates in civil society, and also carries a series of sanctions: whoever breaks the rules of the
game is excluded from the community and can no longer work within it.”  Norms can provide
implicit understandings that discourage opportunistic behavior, effectively filling the gaps in
incomplete contracts and thereby supporting valuable specialized investments.  
Norms of reciprocity may also help suppress free riding behavior and allow for the
voluntary provision of collective or public goods.  Ostrom (1990) provides concrete evidence of
such behavior in her study of self-governing institutions for the management of common pool6
10 See, for example, the studies in Pyke and Sengenberger (1992).
resources (CPRs).  As she points out (pp. 183-184), in small-scale CPR settings, “individuals
repeatedly communicate and interact with one another in a localized physical setting.  Thus, it is
possible that they can learn whom to trust, what effects their actions will have on each other and on
the CPR, and how to organize themselves to gain benefits and avoid harm.  When individuals have
lived in such situations for a substantial time and have developed shared norms and patterns of
reciprocity, they possess social capital with which they can build institutional arrangements for
resolving CPR dilemmas.”
If social capital can support investment in specialized assets and facilitate the production of
collective goods, it may be very valuable indeed.  These features have been discussed in detail in
the literature on the industrial districts of Italy.10  For example, Brusco (1992, p. 180) notes the
element of specialized investment: “Often, an item or component is not ordered on the basis of a
precise design, with detailed specifications.  Rather, the customer explains to the subcontractor the
intended function of the item, and is then ready to consider whether a standard component already
on the market, and therefore less costly, might be used or, on the other hand, whether it might be
prefereable to stay with the original subcontractor, modifying the design of the component, if
necessary, to make manufacture for the subcontractor easier.”  The features of collective goods
arise whenever small firms form consortia for purchasing of inputs, obtaining credit, hiring
accountants for book-keeping and taxes, promoting products at trade fairs, etc. 
A third pathway by which social capital may affect economic growth is by facilitating
innovation.  As Putnam (1993, p. 161) puts it, “Networks facilitate flows of information about
technological developments, about the creditworthiness of would-be entrepreneurs, about the
reliability of individual workers, and so on.  Innovation depends on `continual informal interaction7
11 Jaffe (1986) examines spillovers across industrial firms, while Jaffe (1990) studies spillovers from universities to private firms.  Audretsch and Feldman (1995) focus on the
geographical concentration of spillovers.
12 See, for example, Romer (1986, 1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
13 Piore and Sabel (1986) discuss examples of industrial districts from a variety of different countries.
14 The “third Italy,” located in the north-central part of the country, allegedly fits neither the form of the heavily industrialized regions of the North, nor the underdeveloped regions of the
South.  Bianchi (1994, p. 17), however, argues that “The three geo-economic formations...no longer accurately describe contemporary multi-regional development in Italy.  The Third Italy, in particular,
shows a visible diaspora, if the regions which constituted it today belong to four, or perhaps five, different families.” 
in cafes and bars and in the street.’ ”  Recent empirical work in industrial organization documents
that spillovers are typically stronger for agents in geographical proximity to one another, and that
important spillovers exist across industries as well as within them.11  The “new growth theory”
shows formally how such spillovers can lead to sustained economic growth over time.12  When
spillovers are important, firms often take advantage of them by clustering together in a particular
region, as Krugman (1990) has recently emphasized.  Perhaps the most highly developed form of
such “agglomeration economies” appears in the form of “industrial districts,” tight geographical
clusters of highly specialized firms working in the same industry.  Marshall (1920) was fascinated
by such districts around the turn of the century, and their economic performance has been the
subject of considerable academic interest in recent years.13  The small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) of the “third Italy” are often taken as the prototypical modern example of such
districts.14  Piore and Sabel (1984) make much of the flexible and decentralized mode of production
in the industrial districts, arguing that it presents a model for innovative firms in the post-industrial
era.
Not all authors see social capital as a purely benign resource.  Although he does not use the
term “social capital,” Olson (1982) presents a theory in which networks of association influence
government to provide them with special favors.  In stable societies, such networks grow
increasingly dense, diverting resources from productive activity to rent-seeking, and gradually8
choking off economic growth.  Economic growth thus sows the seeds of its own eventual decline. 
In this view, social capital may well hinder innovation, as interest groups threatened by economic
change use the apparatus of the state to slow its encroachment. This story is consistent with the
empirical results of Inglehart (1994b) and Helliwell (1996), as described earlier.  Both the “light”
and the “dark” sides of social capital must be recognized in any mature understanding of the
concept.
Given the importance of industrial districts in the Italian economy, the nation’s tightly-knit
social fabric, and the influential nature of Putnam’s (1993) study, Italy is a particularly appropriate
place to assess empirically the economic contribution of social capital.  I turn next to the empirical
framework used to do so in this paper.
3. A Simple Model
The basic model I use is a simple extension of the standard production function.  Let the
fundamental production relationship be Yit = F(Kit,Lit,Si,Ait), where Y,K,L,S, and A are, respectively,
value added, capital, labor, social capital, and a productivity measure.  All variables except S are
subscripted by both i and t to indicate that they vary with region i and time t; social capital alone is
assumed not to change over time and varies only by region.  Let lower-case variables be the natural
log of the corresponding upper-case variables, e.g. yit = ln Yit.  
Following Griliches (1995), I take the functional form of the production relationship to be
of the Cobb-Douglas form, so Yit = Ait Kit
"Lit
$Si
(.  In addition, for simplicity, I assume that Ait = e*
i
t . 
The basic relationship that I estimate can then be written as yit = *it + "kit + $lit + (Si.9
My empirical results include estimation of the parameter (, testing for the possible
dependence of investment K on social capital S, and testing for the dependence of * on S.   First,
however, I turn to a discussion of the data to be used.
4. Data
The economic data analyzed here are from ISTAT, the Italian national statistical bureau, and
cover the period from 1970 to 1995.  Data were collected for 17 industry sectors across the 20
Italian regions, providing 340 basic units of observation for the 26 year period.  Included in this
category are data on value added, an industry-level deflator for value added, capital investment,
employment, and payments to labor.  Data on capital investment were not available at the level of
individual industries, so it was necessary to aggregate all production activity at the level of the
region, thus collapsing the number of individual units of observation to 20.  Data on value added
were deflated using the industry-specific deflators, and then summed to create an aggregate measure
of real value added at the regional level.  Data on capital investment were deflated using the
aggregate deflator defined by dividing real value added by nominal value added.  Summary
statistics are presented in Table 1.
Data on social capital in the Italian regions were generously provided by Robert Putnam,
who discusses the data in engrossing detail in his 1993 book, Making Democracy Work.  Here I
provide a capsule summary of the data.  There are nine basic measures of social capital, four of
which are based on “modern” data from 1953-1987, and five of which are based on “historical”
data from 1860-1921.  The measures are of three general types of phenomena: 1) Voting (4
measures), 2) Newspaper readership (1 measure), and 3) Civic associations (4 measures).  In10
addition, there are two summary indices, one for each of the time periods mentioned.  Summary
statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1.
The four voting measures cover several different items.  Two of the measures—referendum
turnouts and preference voting—are from the latter part of the twentieth century.  Putnam (1993, p.
93) notes that standard measures of electoral turnout may not provide a good indication of civic
spirit or social capital, because until recently Italian law required all citizens to vote in general
elections.  However, this requirement did not apply to national referenda, so referendum turnout
provides a better measure of how engaged citizens are in public affairs.  The topics of referenda
during this period included the legalization of divorce, public financing of political parties, public
security and anti-terrorism, wage escalator clauses, and nuclear power.  Conversely, preference
voting indicates lack of true civic engagement.  Italian voters must vote a single party, and
legislative seats are then allocated to parties on a proportional basis.  However, voters can also
choose to indicate their preference for a particular candidate from the party list they have selected. 
Most voters do not bother to do so, but according to Putnam (1993, p. 94), “in areas where party
labels are largely a cover for patron-client networks, these preferences votes are eagerly solicited
by contending factions...The incidence of preference voting has long been acknowledged by
students of Italian politics as a reliable indicator or personalism, factionalism, and patron-client
politics...”  The reported coefficients on preference voting in the results section are multiplied by
minus one to render their signs comparable to those of the other social capital measures.
Two other voting measures—strength of mass parties and electoral turnout—are taken from
the early part of the twentieth century.  Strength of mass parties is based on the percentage of
voters who chose either socialist or Catholic candidates during the period 1919-1921.  Putnam
(1993, p. 142) notes that “the two mass-based parties had common sociological roots in ancient11
traditions of collective solidarity and horizontal collaboration.  At the turn of the century they also
shared opposition to the existing authorities.  Both were weakest where the established
conservative alliance, based on clientelist ties with established social elites of landowners and
officeholders, was strongest.”  Electoral turnout for the period 1919-1921 is also included, as
these were the only elections under “universal manhood suffrage” before Fascism imposed
authoritarian rule upon Italy; voters in these elections were not required by law to participate, so
the measure of electoral turnout is more informative for this period than for the modern period
discussed above.
Newspaper readership provides a simple, modern measure of the extent to which citizens in
a given region are interested in and informed about community affairs.  There is a surprising amount
of variation in this measure, from a high of 80% in Liguria to a low of 35% in Molise.
The third category of variables measures the breadth of participation in various civic
organizations.  One of these variables—association scarcity—is modern, while
three—cooperatives, mutual aid societies, and associations founded before 1860---are historical. 
The measure of association density is computed as the negative of the number of inhabitants in a
region divided by the number of sports and cultural associations in that region.  (The negative is
used to make the predicted sign of the coefficient for this variable positive, like the other social
capital variables).  The measure is surprisingly precise since it makes use of an exhaustive census
of all associations in Italy, both local and national.  Of these associations, 73% are sports clubs,
while the remainder comprise such groups as choral societies, hiking clubs, and literary circles. 
Cooperatives during the period 1889-1915 came in a variety of forms; there were “agricultural
cooperatives, labor cooperatives, credit cooperatives, cooperative rural banks, producer
cooperatives, and consumer cooperatives, the latter comprising more than half of all cooperatives12
15 Putnam (1993, p. 139).
16 Ibid., p. 139.
by 1889.”15  The variable is measured in the years 1889, 1901, 1910, and 1915 as the number of
cooperatives in a region per 1000 inhabitants; these are then aggregated into a factor index for the
period.  Mutual aid societies were also common at the turn of the twentieth century, and served a
wide range of social insurance functions, including “benefits to aged and incapacitated members...;
aid to families of deceased members; compensation for industrial accidents; funeral expenses;
nursing and maternity care; and the provision of educational opportunities for members and their
families, including night schools, elementary instruction, arts and crafts, and circulating
libraries...In effect, mutual aid societies provided a locally organized, underfunded, self-help
version of what the twentieth century would call the welfare state.”16  There is also a measure of
the longevity of associations, measured as the percentage of associations identified in the 1982
census that were formed before 1860.  This measure of old associations provides an indicator of
the stability of cultural and civic activity in each region.
Finally, there are two variables—civic community and civic traditions—that aggregate the
modern and the historical measures, respectively.  All of the social capital variables are quite
highly correlated, as indicated in Table 2.  The correlation between the modern and the historical
measures is particularly surprising, and underlines the continuing importance of culture and
tradition in Italian life. 
5. Results
Several different types of empirical results are reported in this section.  I begin with the
estimation of a simple model of growth in output per capita, which allows me to compare my13
results against those of Helliwell and Putnam (1995), who use a similar, but less detailed, data set. 
I then turn to more detailed estimations that make use of the full data set.  In particular, I report
estimations of a regional production function that includes capital investment, labor, social capital,
and a time trend.  I then turn to a recent criticism of Putnam’s quantitative work on social capital in
Italy, namely that it may provide little additional explanatory power once the broad distinctions
between northern and southern regions of Italy are introduced.  Using two different specifications, I
test for whether social capital continues to have a measurable impact after controlling for whether a
region lies in the North or the South of the country.  Next, I consider the possibility that capital
investment depends on social capital, as suggested by the argument that social capital can reduce
the transaction costs of contracting.  I also re-examine my production function results taking into
account the possible endogeneity of capital investment.  Finally, I examine the relationship between
rates of total factor productivity improvement over time and social capital.
Growth in Output per Capita
As a baseline, I first estimate the growth in output per capita over the sample period, in
order to make my results comparable to those of Helliwell and Putnam (1995).  To do so, I take as
the dependent variable the difference in the natural log of value added per capita in 1995 and the
value of this same variable in 1970.  I then estimate the dependence of this variable on the initial
level of value added per capita, various measures of social capital, and the average level of capital
investment over the time period.  Results are reported in Table 3.
Estimations (1) through (2) exclude capital investment, and report results for the modern
index of civic community and the historical index of civic traditions, respectively.  Like Helliwell
and Putnam (1995), I find social capital is positively and significantly associated with growth in14
17 An estimation with regional fixed effects yielded very similar results, with the elasticity to scale of 1.159 providing a somewhat higher estimate of returns to scale.  
output per capita.  I also tested each of the individual measures of social capital separately, and
found 7 to have positive and significant coefficients, 3 to be positive but not significant, and one to
be negative but not significant.  The measure with the highest t-statistic was the effect of mass
parties, the results for which are reported in estimation (3).  The results in estimations (1) through
(3) are quite similar across the different specifications.  Finally, estimation (4) includes a simple
measure of the average level of annual capital investment in a region over the sample period,
finding it to have a positive and significant effect on growth, and pointing toward the more detailed
production function analysis to be reported next.
Regional Production Functions
The initial production function estimations are reported in Table 4.  Estimation (1) presents
the results without the inclusion of any social capital variables.  The regression has very strong
explanatory power, and the coefficients on all independent variables are positive and highly
significant.  Increasing returns to scale are evident at the regional level, as the sum of the
coefficients on capital and labor is 1.074.17  In this and in all of the other production function
estimations, a test of the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (i.e. that "+$=1) can be rejected at
the 1% confidence level or better.  Improved productivity over time is evident in the positive and
highly significant coefficient on the number of periods, which shows a rate of productivity increase
of 1.9% per year.
Estimations (2) and (3) include, respectively, the modern and historical index measures for
social capital.  In each case, the coefficients on the original independent variables change only
modestly.  More importantly, each measure of social capital has a positive and highly significant15
effect on productivity.  Since these are index variables, they are constructed so as to have a mean
approximately equal to zero and a standard deviation approximately equal to one.  Thus, if social
capital were to increase by one standard deviation, productivity would increase by roughly 9.0% in
estimation (2) and roughly 10.25% in estimation (2).  Although results are not reported here, any
single one of the social capital measures, if included in the production function, is of the predicted
sign and is highly significant.
Estimation (4) includes both index measures for social capital.  The modern measure has a
larger coefficient than in (2) and remains highly significant. The historical measure has a negative
and significant coefficient.  This suggests that social capital may be more valuable when it is of
more recent creation. At the same time, the high correlation between the social capital measures,
and the small number of regions, demand caution in interpreting the results of estimations with
multiple measures of social capital.  With this in mind, I turn now to examining whether the
individual measures provide interesting results when used jointly as explanatory variables.
Estimation (5) includes all four of the modern measures of social capital, as well as the
percentage of associations that pre-dated 1860; 520 observations are available for each of these
variables.  All but referendum turnout are highly significant.  Less preference voting has a positive
and significant effect on productivity, as expected; an increase of one standard deviation in the
extent of preference voting would reduce productivity by about 3%.  Greater news readership has a
small, positive and significant effect, as expected; when news readership increases by one percent,
productivity improves by 0.6%.  Association density enters with the wrong sign and is significant. 
Finally, the greater the percentage of associations that are long-lived, the higher is productivity.
Estimation (6) includes all five of the historical measures of social capital.  Three prove
significant: membership in mass parties, formation of cooperatives, and formation of mutual aid16
societies.  All three are positive and significant at the 5% level or greater.  Electoral turnout and
longevity of associations are positive but not significant at the 10% level.
Estimation (7) includes all nine measures of social capital (excluding the aggregated index
measures).  Of the modern measures, preference voting, news readership, and association scarcity
are of the expected signs and significant.  Of the historical measures, cooperatives and electoral
turnout are significant and of the expected sign, while mutual aid societies and longevity of
associations are significant but of the wrong sign.
In summary, the measures of social capital tested in Table 4 produce significant coefficients
of the expected sign in 14 cases, and significant coefficients of the opposite sign in 4 cases.  Any
single measure of social capital, when included in the production function, has a positive and highly
significant effect on output.  However, anomalies crop up as more variables are included, perhaps
due to the high correlation between the various measures.  Four measures are consistently
significant and of the correct sign, even when combined with other explanatory variables: the
modern community index, preference voting from 1953-1979, newspaper readership in 1975, and
formation of cooperatives from 1889-1915.
The “Two Italies”
In a recent critique of Putnam’s (1993) quantitative work, Goldberg (1996) argues that
Putnam’s measures of social capital provide little or no additional explanatory power once a
dummy variable for “North” or “South” is included in the analysis.  Indeed, it is widely recognized
that the northern and southern parts of Italy are radically different in many respects, including their
income levels. The contrast between the two parts of the country is so sharp as to engender the
common phrase “the two Italies” and to provoke discussion of “the southern problem.” Although17
18 I do not attempt to subdivide Italy into three or more separate regions.  Bianchi (1994) shows that a tripartite division of the country (North, South, and the “third” or central part) is no
longer justifiable based on quantitative data, and divisions into four or more parts would render the impact of social capital untestable.
19 I have included as northern the following regions: Piemonte, Lombardia, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige-Sudtirol, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna,
Toscana, Umbria, and Marche.  The southern regions are Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, and Sardegna.
20 Although the regressions were run with a constant term, it is not reported here in the interest of keeping the table on a single page.
Putnam is concerned with measuring the performance of government while I am concerned with
economic performance, Goldberg’s critique may be applicable here as well: the measures of social
capital used here may simply be proxies for broad differences between northern and southern Italy,
and may provide little or no additional explanatory power once the north/south distinction is
controlled for.  I turn next to exploring this possibility.18
Table 5 presents some summary statistics for the northern and southern portions of Italy.19 
On all dimensions, northern Italy is numerically highly superior to southern Italy.  Tables 6-8
present the results of a series of estimations that account in various ways for the differences
between North and South.  Table 6 presents three estimations that include a dummy variable
separating regions into North and South.  Table 7 explores growth in northern Italy in more detail,
while Table 8 does the same for southern Italy.
In Table 6, estimation (1) simply considers the production function with a dummy variable
for “South” included.20  The dummy variable is negative and highly significant, as expected. 
Estimation (2) adds in the two summary measures of social capital, one for the modern period and
one for the historical period of a century ago.  Both measures of social capital are positive and
significant at the 11% level; the modern index is significant beyond the 0.1% level.  Interestingly,
the dummy variable changes signs once the two measures of social capital are included.  This
suggests that once physical capital, labor, and social capital are controlled for, the South is actually
more productive than the North.  Put another way, the South’s lower level of economic output18
appears to be due to its lower levels of productive inputs, not the use of inferior production
techniques.
Estimation (3) adds the full panoply of social capital measures (omitting the composite
index measures).  Preference voting, newspaper readership, associational density, and the presence
of mass parties during 1919-1921 all are highly significant and have the expected sign.  Formation
of mutual aid societies and longevity of associations are significant but have the opposite sign to
what was expected.  The performance of the social capital measures is thus mixed.  Nevertheless,
Goldberg’s (1996) critique does not seem to apply to these estimates of economic
production—even when we control for the existence of the “two Italies,” quantitative measures of
social capital appear to have significant economic effects.
Tables 7 and 8 explore northern and southern Italy, respectively,  in more detail.  Although
the results are not presented here, I ran a set of 22 regressions (11 each for North and South) each
containing a single measure of social capital.  In 19 cases, including all 11 runs for the South, the
coefficient on the social capital variable was of the expected sign and highly significant.  In the
North, referendum turnout and associational density had the wrong signs and were significant,
while mutual aid societies were not statistically significant.  From these runs taking a single
measure of social capital at a time, Goldberg’s critique does not apply to the South at all, and is
largely incorrect for the North as well.  The results in Tables 7 and 8 examine the performance of
various combinations of social capital variables.
In Table 7, estimation (1) confirms that the basic production function for the North (without
social capital) differs little from the function estimated for the country as a whole.  Estimation (2)
finds the modern index of social capital has a positive and highly significant coefficient, while the
historical index is negative and significant.  Estimations (3) and (4) examine the set of modern and19
historical measures, respectively.  Of the modern measures, newspaper readership is positive and
highly significant, as expected, but associational density is negative and highly significant, contrary
to expectations.  Of the historical measures, cooperatives and electoral turnout have the expected
sign and are significant, but mass parties, mutual aid societies, and longevity of associations are
significant and have signs contrary to expectations.
This set of results indicates that combinations of social capital measures—at least as
captured by Putnam’s variables—do not perform as well for the North as they do for the country as
a whole.  In some ways, this is not surprising since the number of observations has been cut roughly
in half.  However, five variables have the wrong sign while only four have the expected sign;
Goldberg’s critique clearly has some bite when the North is considered separately and multiple
social capital measures are included.  While these results must be interpreted cautiously, they are
not inconsistent with Olson’s (1982) hypothesis regarding the potentially deleterious effects of self-
interested associations on growth in developed countries.  They are also consistent with the results
of Inglehart (1994b), who found that social capital tended to reduce growth in more developed
countries, but enhanced it in less developed countries.
Table 8 considers the South separately.  Again results are mixed, but they are better than for
the North.  Seven measures enter with the correct sign and are significant, while two are significant
and of the wrong sign.  The modern index of social capital performs well, as do the measures of
referendum turnout, preference voting, associational density, cooperatives, historical electoral
turnout, and longevity of associations.  Mass parties and mutual aid societies, however, are
significant and enter with the wrong sign.  Apparently social capital has a more beneficial impact in
the South than in the North.20
Overall, the results for the “two Italies” indicate that Putnam’s measures of social capital
retain significance when applied to the North and the South of Italy separately.  They are not as
powerful at this level, however.  When considered one at a time, nineteen variables have
significant coefficients of the correct sign, while two have significant coefficients of the wrong
sign.   When combinations of variables are examined, sixteen significant coefficients have the
correct sign, while nine do not.  In concert with other variables, only the modern index of social
capital is consistently successful in explaining economic productivity, although the historical
formation of cooperatives and historical election turnout also have explanatory power in both parts
of the country.  Of particular interest is the fact that a majority of the individual social capital
measures have a negative impact on output in the North, while the reverse is true in the South.  This
provides a measure of support for Olson’s (1982) hypothesis regarding the negative relationship
between group formation and economic growth in developed economies.  Further research probing
detailed measures should help to separate out measurement problems from meaningful causal
effects of specific forms of social capital in more and less developed regions.  
Physical Capital and Social Capital
One of the explanations for why social capital may contribute positively to economic
growth is that it reduces the transaction costs of writing contracts to solve holdup problems.  This
suggests that capital investment may depend upon social capital.  Knack and Kiefer (1997) found
somewhat tenuous evidence to support this hypothesis, with some measures of social capital
contributing positively to investment but with their measure of association density having a negative
effect.  In this section, I test this hypothesis using the detailed year-to-year data on capital
investment available in my data set.  21
In these regressions the dependent variable is the natural log of real capital investment.  As
mentioned earlier, I do not have reliable data on regional capital investment at the level of the
industry sector.  However, I do have data on the value added by sector for each region and year.  I
use this data to construct a variable that measures the standard deviation of value added in each
region on an annual basis.  The hypothesis is that regions with output concentrated in particular
sectors will have better access to the financial capital needed to expand their capital stocks.  Italy
is not known for the advanced state of its financial markets, and larger firms with substantial free
cash flow or groups of firms with good access to financial markets may be in better positions to
invest in physical capital.  The standard deviation of value added is intended to proxy for this
effect.
Estimation (1) includes as independent variables the time period, a dummy variable for the
South, the standard deviation of value added, and the modern index of civic community.  All of the
independent variables are highly significant and have the expected signs.  Capital investment has
been increasing over time.  More surprisingly, the South has a significantly higher level of
investment than the North.  This may be due to the various deliberate attempts by the Italian
government to channel investment into the South, though I cannot confirm that speculation
empirically.  Variance in value added has a large and significant negative impact on investment, as
expected.  The modern index of civic community has a positive and significant coefficient.
Estimations (2) through (5) repeat the exercise with alternative measures of social capital. 
Through all of the estimations, variance in value added has a highly significant and negative impact
on investment.  Of particular interest is estimation (4), which measures the effect of associational
density on investment.  Like Knack and Keefer (1997), I find that a dense network of associations is
negatively and significantly associated with capital investment.22
21 The exceptions to this pattern were that old associations had a negative effect on investment in the North but a positive effect in the South; preference voting had a beneficial effect on
investment in the South but not in the North; and electoral turnout was insignificant in the South.
I also estimated the investment function separately for the North and South of Italy.  The
results for the North were very similar to those for the country as a whole.  The results for the
South, however, tended to show an insignificant growth in capital investment over time and an
insignificant effect of variance in value added on investment.  Despite these differences, the role of
social capital was quite consistent across the two parts of Italy.  While the magnitude of the effects
of particular measures of social capital differed across the two Italies, their sign and level of
statistical significance were generally the same.21  In particular, this held true for the role of
associational density: it was negatively and significantly associated with investment in both halves
of the country.  This was the most striking “dark side” to social capital identified in this project.
Given the dependence of capital investment on social capital, I re-estimated the regional
production function allowing for this endogeneity.  The results are presented in Table 10. 
Estimation (1) establishes a benchmark using OLS, and including the two index measures of social
capital along with the standard deviation of value added.  The coefficient on standard deviation of
value added is small and not statistically significant.  This variable thus appears to be a good
candidate as an instrument for capital investment.  
Estimation (2) uses two-stage least squares and uses the standard deviation of value added
as an instrument for capital investment.  Since the index of civic traditions is not significant at the
10% level in estimation (1), estimation (2) focuses on the modern index.  The dummy for the South
is now insignificant, but the other variables retain the same signs as in estimation (1) and are highly
statistically significant.  In particular, the modern index of civic community has a significant direct
effect on output, in addition to its indirect effect through the support of capital investment.23
Given the negative relationship between associational density and capital investment,
estimation (3) presents results taking associational density as the measure of social capital.  The
two-stage least squares results indicate that associational density has a significant direct positive
effect on output, although density’s indirect effect on output through its effects of capital investment
are negative.  When this estimation was repeated for the North and South of the country separately,
results were similar to those reported in Tables 7 and 8, where capital investment was treated as
exogenous: associational density’s direct effect on output is negative in the North but positive in the
South, although the indirect effect (through capital investment) is negative in both parts of the
country.
Estimation (4) takes as instruments the standard deviation of value added as well as all of
the individual measures of social capital.  It also includes the two index measures of social capital
as explanatory variables.  Again, the results indicate that the measures of social capital have a
positive direct effect on output as well as a positive indirect effect through enhanced capital
investment.  I also repeated estimation (4) for the North and South separately; the modern index of
social capital was significant and positive in both parts of the country, but the traditional index was 
insignificant in both parts.  
Total Factor Productivity and Social Capital
The results presented thus far are static: they examine how social capital affects economic
output at a given time.  In order to study the effect of social capital on dynamic changes in
productivity, another approach is necessary.  Instead of pooling the regions, as in the preceding
results, I ran separate regressions for each region, taking as independent variables only capital,
labor, and time.  The coefficient on time then provides a measure of dynamic total factor24
22 For further details, see Dowrick and Gemmell (1991) and Helliwell (1996).
23 They hypothesize that the increased power granted to regional governments in 1980 may have been responsible for this reversal.  
24 As an illustration of this pattern, the standard deviations were .152 in 1970, .115 in 1975, .115 in 1980, .120 in 1985, .134 in 1990, and .124 in 1995.
productivity improvement.  The mean annual rate of improvement was 2.11%, with a standard
deviation of 0.289%, a minimum of 1.63% (Piemonte) and a maximum of 2.65% (Puglia).  A full
listing of the rates of productivity growth in each region, with the regions ranked from highest to
lowest, is presented in Table 11.  
One striking thing about these results is that for the most part, the fastest growing regions are
in the South, not the North.  This is consistent with recent empirical work that finds a tendency
toward convergence in economic growth rates across nations that have reached at least a minimum
threshold of development.22  Helliwell and Putnam (1995) caution about accepting the convergence
hypothesis for the case of the Italian regions, since they find per capita income levels diverged
between 1984 and 1990, after more than 20 years of convergence.23  To assess this concern, I
examined the standard deviation of value added per capita over my sample from 1970 to 1995. 
Like Helliwell and Putnam, I found convergence up until 1983, and divergence (increasing standard
deviations) from 1984 through 1990.  After 1990, however, the trend reversed itself once again,
with a particularly sharp reduction in 1991.24  Given this pattern, I have opted to eschew detailed
analysis of the time pattern of convergence and divergence, and to focus instead on the broad trend
across the sample period.
The unconditional relationship between productivity growth over the sample period and
social capital is presented in Table 12.  Simple correlations are presented for each of the social
capital measures.  Productivity growth is negatively associated with every single one of Putnam’s
measures of social capital.  Furthermore, the degree of correlation is remarkably high in many25
cases.   These correlations are consistent with Olson’s (1982) theory that the proliferation of
interest groups hinders innovation.  They are also consistent with the work of Inglehart (1994b),
who found a negative partial correlation between social capital and growth in a set of developed
countries, and Helliwell (1996), who found a negative partial correlation between social capital
and growth for seventeen OECD countries.
To probe this relationship further, I regressed the regional growth rates on the regional level
of value added per capita in 1970, a dummy variable for the South, and various measures of social
capital.   If the convergence hypothesis is correct, regions with low levels of value added per
capita in 1970 should grow faster than other regions, gradually catching up to their more developed
brethren.  Similar logic suggests that regions in the South are likely to grow faster than those in the
North.  Following the work of Dowrick and Gemmell (1991),  who study a sample of countries
ranging from rich to poor over the period 1960-1985, I also tried several measures of agricultural
productivity in 1970, on the hypothesis that regions with large and/or relatively unproductive
agricultural sectors may be further from the production frontier, and may thus have the ability to
grow faster than other regions.  The results are reported in Table 13.  
As predicted by the convergence hypothesis, regions with low initial levels of value added
per capita grew significantly faster during the period 1970-1995, a result that is robust across
estimations (1) - (4).  Also as predicted, all four estimations that include the dummy variable for
the South find that the South grew significantly faster than the North during the sample period.  I ran
a variety of regressions for North and South separately, but these were hampered by the very small
number of observations for each region, and most social capital measures proved insignificant. 
Preference voting and the existence of mass political parties were the most powerful social capital
measures in these estimations.  Estimations (5) and (6), for the North and South separately, show26
results using the mass political parties measure; as in estimations (1) - (4), initial levels of value
added per capita are negatively associated with future growth, with coefficients similar to those in
estimations (1) - (4) , but in estimations (5) and (6) the effect is not significant at the 10% level.  
The variables measuring agricultural productivity in 1970 generally proved thoroughly
insignificant.  I report one of these results in estimation (4), using a measure of real value added per
employee in the agriculture sector in 1970, without significant results. Experimenting with various
combinations of agricultural productivity (including the ratio of employees in industry to employees
in agriculture and the ratio of industrial value added to agricultural value added) and social capital
failed to yield any consistent significant results for the agricultural variables.
Contrary to the earlier work of Inglehart (1994b) and Helliwell (1996), the social capital
measures are consistently positive, indicating that social capital helped rather than harmed
productivity growth.  While the coefficients are generally not significant at the 10% level, these
results are important nevertheless, since they imply rejection of Olson’s (1982) hypothesis that
associational membership causes growth rates to decline.  The pattern of these results on total
factor productivity growth is similar to that found by Knack and Keefer (1997), although one of
their estimations produced a negative relationship between social capital and TFP growth and only
one of the estimations with a positive coefficient achieved a t-statistic greater than 1.0.  The results
for the Italian regions, then, suggest a somewhat stronger relationship between social capital and
TFP growth than found by Knack and Keefer (1997).
It is important to distinguish these results from those of Helliwell and Putnam (1995), who
also studied the twenty Italian regions.  They found that growth in GDP per capita from 1950-1990
was positively associated with social capital.  Because these authors did not have measures of
capital investment on a regional basis, their findings confound the effects of capital accumulation27
and technological improvement, and thus may be driven by the positive effect of social capital on
capital investment that was demonstrated above in Table 9.  The results in Table 13, however, have
already stripped out the effects of capital investment, and focus directly on how social capital
affects the rate of innovation.  To my knowledge, this is the first paper to find a positive and
significant relationship between social capital and rates of total factor productivity growth.
The contrast between my results and those for broader groups of countries raises some
interesting issues.  Is Italian social capital “special” in some sense, allowing it to avoid the
negative effects identified in other papers?  Does the process of aggregating social capital data to
the national, rather than regional, level cause the difference in the results?  Further work that makes
use of both inter-regional and international data is needed to answer such questions.
6. Conclusions
Using data from the 20 Italian regions, I find that social capital supports economic
productivity through three channels: 1) increasing static production possibilities, 2) increasing
capital investment, and 3) increasing dynamic growth in total factor productivity.
Quantitative measures of social capital, when included in a regional production function,
generally have positive and significant impacts on economic value added.  The measures with
greatest explanatory power are Putnam’s composite index of modern social capital, newspaper
readership, the historical formation of cooperatives from 1889-1915, and electoral turnout from
1919-1921.  Even for these variables, however, the magnitude of the effect on productivity is
relatively modest.  Typically an increase of one standard deviation in the level of social capital
raises value added by around 10%.  While this is hardly trivial, it does not approach the
importance of the familiar economic inputs of capital and labor.  An increase of one standard28
deviation in capital assets would raise value added by roughly 32%, while a one standard
deviation in labor employed would raise value added by about 66%.  Social capital appears to be
a significant, but not dominant, input.
Social capital does not appear to be just a proxy for the broad set of differences that
separate the North and South of the country into “two Italies.”  Even after controlling for location in
the North or South, the measures of social capital provide significant explanatory power within
each of these parts of the country, although their power is substantially less than when applied to
the country as a whole.  Interestingly, and consistent with Olson’s (1982) view that interest group
proliferation dampens the growth of developed economies, the majority of social capital variables
(including associational density, as Olson would predict) have negative coefficients in the North,
while the opposite is true in the South.  
A second means through which social capital affects economic output is through its effects
on capital investment.  Both Putnam’s modern index of civicness and his index of civic traditions
are significantly positively associated with higher investment.  The strongest relationship,
somewhat surprisingly, is between the formation of mass political parties in the early part of the
20th century and recent capital investment.  Variance in industry sectoral composition has a
significant negative impact on investment, yet has little direct impact on industry value added; it
thus makes a good instrument for capital investment.  Instrumental variable estimates taking capital
investment as endogenous indicate that most measures of social capital contribute to economic
productivity both directly as a factor of production and indirectly through supporting more
investment.
The most striking “dark side” to social capital in this analysis appears in the effects of
associational density on capital investment.  In both the North and South of Italy, dense networks of29
association have a negative and significant relationship to capital investment.  Estimations using
variance in value added as an instrument for capital investment find that association density has a
positive direct effect on output in the South but a negative direct effect in the North.  For this form
of social capital, then, Olson’s (1982) view receives significant support here. 
The third channel through which social capital may matter is by affecting growth in total
factor productivity.  Simple correlations show that rates of productivity growth are negatively
correlated with every social capital variable examined here.  This appears at first glance to support
Olson’s (1982) theory that the proliferation of associational groups chokes off innovation.  The
literature on convergence of growth rates across countries, however, suggests the correlation may
be spurious: less-developed regions tend to grow faster than developed ones, as they borrow ideas
and techniques from the latter, and they also tend to have low levels of social capital, but this does
not mean low levels of social capital improve growth.  Regression analysis that controls for both a
region’s initial level output level per capita, and its level of social capital, finds that low-output
regions do indeed tend to grow faster, but once this effect is controlled for, social capital has a
positive (if usually insignificant) rather than a negative effect on productivity growth.
While the results obtained here are quite fascinating, they raise a number of questions. 
Several of the social capital variables produce results that are contrary to expectations (at least in
certain combinations) or unstable across different specifications.  Further research is needed to
determine whether this is due to limitations in the data or to underlying theoretical factors that have
yet to be clearly identified.  In addition, the results on social capital and total factor productivity
growth stand in contrast to those found in cross-country comparisons, raising interesting questions
about how inter-regional comparisons can be squared with international ones. 30
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Value Added 520 51484.26.8 49260.39 2053.15 270183.6
Investment 520 11333.85 9605.22 623.76 51044.42
Employment (000) 520 1094.368 902.04 52.5 4057.2
Referendum Turnout
1974-1987
520 -.0005 .975 -1.93 1.4
Preference Voting
1953-1979
520 .0065 .9498 -1.58 1.2
News Readership (%)
1975
520 62.75 13.05 35 80
Assn. Density 
1981
520 0 .9757 -2.19 1.3
Mass Parties 
1919-21
442 -.0147 .9767 -1.5 1.33
Cooperatives 
1889-1915
442 -.00118 .9703 -1.11 2.34
Mutual Aid Societies
1873-1904
442 -.0441 1.0437 -1.84 1.86
Electoral Turnout
1919-1921




520 .578 .6759 0 3.13
Community Index 
1953-1987
520 0 .9757 -1.64 1.08
Tradition Index
1860-1920
442 -.0682 .9104 -1.33 1.4531
Table 2: Correlation of Social Capital Measures
COM REF PREF NEWS ASSOC TRAD MASS COOP MUT ELEC OLD
COM 1.00
REF .96 1.00
PREF .95 .91 1.00
NEWS .88 .79 .75 1.00
ASSOC .89 .79 .81 .69 1.00
TRAD .93 .90 .91 .85 .73 1.00
MASS .91 .90 .91 .81 .70 .97 1.00
COOP .85 .80 .84 .81 .65 .93 .90 1.00
MUT .86 .82 .80 .80 .74 .91 .88 .76 1.00
ELEC .69 .70 .74 .62 .44 .78 .71 .68 .61 1.00
OLD .58 .56 .50 .42 .66 .56 .54 .49 .46 .24 1.0032
Table 3: Determinants of Growth in Output Per Capita
(Dep. Variable is Ln VA/Capita 1995 - Ln VA/Capita 1970)































Adjusted R2 .5267 .6020 .5858 .6314
Observations 20 17 17 20
t-statistics in parentheses
*     = Significant at the 10% level
**   = Significant at the 5% level
*** = Significant at the 1% level33
Table 4: Determinants of Economic Output
(Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added)

































































































































2 .9909 .9970 .9959 .9970 .9979 .9961 .9980
Observations 520 520 442 442 520 442 442
t-statistics in parentheses34
*     = Significant at the 10% level
**   = Significant at the 5% level
*** = Significant at the 1% level35
Table 5: Northern vs. Southern Italy
Variable Mean: North Mean: South
Value Added 60352.17 40645.71
Investment 12566.62 9827.14
Employment (000) 1224.17 935.71
Cooperatives 1889-1915 .789 -.703
Mutual Aid Societies 1873-1904 .878 -.863
Community Index 1953-1987 .793 -.969
Tradition Index 1860-1920 .780 -.82236
Table 6: Output with Southern Dummy Variable
(Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added)




































































2 .9950 .9977 .9982
Observations 520 442 442
t-statistics in parentheses
*     = Significant at the 10% level
**   = Significant at the 5% level 
*** = Significant at the 1% level37
Table 7: Output in Northern Italy
(Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added)












































































2 .9974 .9976 .9990 .9983
Observations 286 208 286 208
t-statistics in parentheses **   = Significant at the 5% level
*     = Significant at the 10% level *** = Significant at the 1% level38
Table 8: Output in Southern Italy
(Dependent Variable: Ln Value Added)












































































2 .9918 .9978 .9982 .9965
Observations 234 234 234 234
t-statistics in parentheses **   = Significant at the 5% level
*     = Significant at the 10% level *** = Significant at the 1% level39
Table 9: Investment and Social Capital
(OLS Estimates--Dependent Variable is Ln of Real Capital Investment)



















































Adjusted R2 .2838 .5429 .4764 .3295 .6943
Observations 520 442 520 520 442
t-statistics in parentheses
*     = Significant at the 10% level
**   = Significant at the 5% level
*** = Significant at the 1% level40
Table 10: Output and Social Capital with Endogenous Investment





































































Adjusted R2 .9977 .9928 .9930 .9968
Observations 442 520 520 442
t-statistics in parentheses
*     = Significant at the 10% level
**   = Significant at the 5% level
*** = Significant at the 1% level41
Table 11: Rates of Productivity Improvement over Time





















Table 12: Correlation between Productivity Growth and Social Capital
Social Capital Measure Correlation with Productivity Growth
Community Index 1953-1987 -.4779
Tradition Index 1860-1920 -.5406
Referendum Turnout 1974-87 -.3857
Preference Voting 1953-1979 -.3637
News Readership 1975 -.4827
Assn. Scarcity 1981 -.5328
Mass Parties 1919-21 -.4690
Cooperatives 1889-1915 -.4634
Mutual Aid Societies 1873-1904 -.6627
Electoral Turnout 1919-1921 -.3874
Old Associations pre-1860 -.171943
Table 13: Total Factor Productivity Growth and Social Capital
(Dep. Variable is Rate of Productivity Growth from 1970-1995)




















































Adjusted R2 .2093 .2874 .4612 .4338 .1654 .3046
Observations 20 20 17 17 8 944
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